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Objectives - There has been limited discussion of the conceptual dimensions of the 
Social Enterprise Mark (SEM), or the implications of its growing legitimacy.  This paper 
makes a contribution to knowledge by critically discussing the conceptual dimensions of 
the SEM and providing some empirical data on its likely effects. 
Prior Work - Recent attempts by the academic community to define the social 
enterprise sector have run into linguistic and practical problems.  Any definition tends to 
privilege one group of social enterprises over another with the result that co-operative 
and employee-owned enterprises, or enterprises pioneering public service reform, are 
marginalised in policy discourse.  The arrival of the SEM in the United Kingdom takes 
place amidst these conceptual and practical difficulties. 
Approach – The paper is an exploratory study based on feedback from participants on 
open access co-operative and social enterprise courses.  They were asked to study 
published SEM criteria then evaluate three forms of social enterprise activity (a worker 
co-operative, a trading charity and a self-employed consultant). Participants were asked 
to rank these in order of likelihood of obtaining the SEM.   
Results - Course participants from different sectoral backgrounds drew the same 
conclusions. Criteria were perceived to favour CICs and trading charities with social and 
environmental objects, but not enterprises that deliver social benefits through 
transforming labour relations and wealth sharing arrangements.  Participants on the first 
course were bemused (and in some cases angered) when they found that award winning 
social enterprises would not meet, or have been denied, the SEM. 
Implications - The SEM's evaluation criteria currently favour 'social purpose' enterprises 
that explicitly target a beneficiary group or community, and not 'socialised' enterprises 
that transform labour relations, promote participative democracy, or design new wealth 
sharing arrangements. 
Value - The paper suggests there has been a shift away from the values advanced by 
the founders of the UK social enterprise movement in the mid-1990s towards values 
embedded in The Social Enterprise Mark.  The paper proposes a critical research strategy 
to investigate the origins and potential effects of applying the SEM‟s criteria. 
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Social enterprise has emerged as a new way to describe a wide variety of organisational 
forms and entrepreneurial approaches that embed social responsibility in enterprising 
activities.  Touted as both the economic engine of the future (Harding and Cowley, 2004) 
and the main vehicle for corporate social responsibility (CSR) (London and Morfopoulos, 
2010), considerable confusion has arisen regarding its nature and contribution to 
changing business practice.  Recent attempts by academics to define the social 
enterprise sector have run into linguistic and practical problems.  Any definition, it 
seems, privileges one group of social enterprises over another (Lyon and Sepulveda, 
2009; Dart, Clow and Armstrong, 2010).  Issues include acknowledging the social 
contribution (and even purpose of) worker co-operative and employee-owned enterprises 
(Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011) as well as lack of recognition for innovative approaches to 
public service delivery (Dart, Clow and Armstrong, 2010). 
 The arrival of the Social Enterprise Mark in the United Kingdom takes place amidst 
these conceptual and practical difficulties.  Given that it has proved difficult to create a 
conceptualisation of social enterprise that is adequate for the purposes of sector 
mapping, there is understandable interest in the Social Enterprise Mark as a definition of 
social enterprise (hereafter referred to as “SEM” or “the SEM”).  The purpose of the SEM, 
according to its principal advocates, is to defend the social enterprise „brand‟ from 
government-funded bodies and voluntary sector organisations that are neither 
autonomous from the state, nor pursuing their social objects through trading.  Another 
argument for the SEM is to prevent private corporations claiming they are social 
enterprises on the basis of their PR and community-support activities (Finlay, 2010).  It 
is, therefore, timely to engage in an analysis of the conceptual dimensions of the Social 
Enterprise Mark and consider the implications should its legitimacy grow (Allan, 2005). 
 The motivation for writing this paper comes from a series of private conversations in 
the social enterprise research community, and seminars at three co-operative and social 
enterprise courses1, on the impact of applying the criteria in The Social Enterprise Mark 
to different scenarios.  The attitude in the academic community to the idea of a 
normalising framework has been one of ambivalence (as a policy option), mainly on the 
basis that it would decrease innovation and devalue the contribution of social enterprises 
that do not fit neatly into standardised criteria (see Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 
Curtis, 2008; Teasdale, 2011).  This paper reviews feedback from seminar participants, 
and highlights bemusement (and occasional anger) at the impact of applying the SEM‟s 
criteria to different types of social economy trading. 
 It is the explication of this ambivalence, bemusement and occasional anger that 
creates the justification for further critical research.  Kinchloe and McClaren (1994) 
emphasise that critical research should rebalance accounts of a phenomenon so that 
hidden discourses surface and dominant discourses can be re-evaluated.  The perspective 
adopted in this paper (and research project) is that this can be achieved though a 
democratic research design that permits voices previously silenced to counter the effects 
of distorted communication that arise out of asymmetries in power (Habermas, 1984). 
 The theoretical perspective of the paper, therefore, is similar to Curtis (2008) in that 
critical research is regarded as a useful strategy to prevent executive capture of social 
enterprise and to promote critical thinking regarding its conceptualisation.  Ironically, we 
also argue that it is necessary to prevent the subversion of perspectives considered 
important when social enterprise agencies were created in the UK (see Teasdale, 2011). 
                                         
1  Co-operative and Social Enterprise Summer School (July 2010) held at Sheffield Business 
School; St Legers Co-operative and Social Enterprise School held at St Mary‟s Church, 
Sheffield (March 2011); Charity Trading and Social Enterprise (MSc module), Sheffield 
Business School (June 2011). 
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 This paper is divided into five sections.  In the first section, the authors surface new 
evidence on the origins of the social enterprise sector in the UK to distinguish between 
attempts to socialise enterprise, and enterprises that pursue a social purpose.  Having 
made this theoretical framework explicit, the authors explore the shift in its 
conceptualisation over the last 15 years.  This shift, it will be argued, is linked to the 
involvement of public, voluntary and charitable sector agencies in the consultations for a 
Community Interest Company (CIC) and continued attempts to propagate New Public 
Management in the wake of financial crises. 
 The second section sets out the methodology used to explore the emphasis on 
„socialisation‟ and „social purpose‟ in the SEM‟s evaluation criteria.  The third section 
presents the findings from three groups of part-time students engaged in social 
enterprise development.  Based on these findings, we argue that potential SEM 
applicants believe that trading charities and non-profit organisations are advantaged by 
the SEM‟s criteria, while worker co-operatives and employee-owned businesses are 
disadvantaged.  In the discussion, we explore the apparent contradiction between the 
early and recent development of social enterprise and highlight the role of New Public 
Management (Hood, 1995) in contributing to this re-conceptualisation.  In our 
conclusions, we draw the strands of argument together and set out the implications for 
the next phase of critical research. 
Rediscovering Socialised Enterprises 
In tracing the history of attempts to conceptualise social enterprise, it is helpful to 
distinguish between the member orientation of the co-operative and employee-ownership 
movements and the beneficiary orientation of charities, non-governmental and non-profit 
organisations (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Kerlin, 2010).  The former emphasise: open 
membership schemes that remove barriers to legal membership; the issue of share 
capital to members that give powers to elect governing bodies; trading models and 
wealth sharing arrangements that democratise control of capital.  The latter, on the other 
hand, emphasise: organisational models that prevent the issue of share capital; a 
preference for non-profit and charitable company governance that inhibits employee and 
beneficiary involvement; capital raising from philanthropic sources (Ridley-Duff and Bull, 
2011). 
While some academics continue to frame social enterprise in terms of long-standing 
non-profit characteristics (see Haugh, 2005; Domenico et al., 2010), early theorisations 
of „social‟ in the context of both social entrepreneurship and social enterprise owe a debt 
to the work of Ellerman (1984, 1990). Ellerman argued that entrepreneurship had been 
socialised in the Mondragon network of co-operatives and proceeded to develop a theory 
of social institutions based on the acquisition of citizenship rights to govern.  Firstly, he 
argued that social institutions adopt governance arrangements in which the people 
governed by them have the capacity to influence both the governance system and the 
selection of governors.  It follows from this argument that worker co-operatives and 
employee-owned firms are „social‟ rather than „private‟ enterprises, particularly where 
this is combined with workforce participation and democratic self-management.  Ellerman 
also argued that to sustain socialisation, master-slave norms of employment would have 
to be replaced with association and partnership models of organising.  This perspective 
was emphasized in early social enterprise policy and definitional debates in both the UK 
and EU (see Westall, 2001; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2002). 
At the heart of Ellerman‟s argument is an assumption that governing bodies that deny 
those it governs the power to design and participate in the governance system, and 
which reinforces this separation through adopting the master-slave norms of employment 
law, will not be able to sustain a social enterprise.  This argument is similar to Turnbull 
(1994, 1995) who considers in more detail which stakeholder groups are governed by 
trading enterprises.  The “governed”, Turnbull argued, are primarily the workforce.  
Suppliers can deliberately (and legally) diversify their customer base.  Customers can 
(legally) shop around.  Employees, typically, have limited scope to do the same after 
they enter an employment contract.  Unlike a supplier who has legal support to organise 
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their business so they can sell to anyone who wants to buy from them and to purchase 
from any supplier whose goods they can afford to buy, employment contracts normally 
prevent employees from working for anyone else concurrently without their employer‟s 
permission.  Employment law also permits the disciplining or sacking of employees who 
are not loyal to their employer (Erdal, 2011). Employees, therefore, are subject to 
governance systems at work, and are continually affected by them, in ways that other 
stakeholders are not (Turnbull, 2002).   
The lack of influence that governors have over the daily lives of customers, suppliers 
and financiers means that these groups are not governed by the enterprise in a 
meaningful sense.  Their formal inclusion in governance, while helpful to the balancing of 
multi-stakeholder interests, is not sufficient to claim that the enterprise is „social‟ 
(Ridley-Duff, 2007).  For Ellerman and Turnbull, voluntary organisations, charities and 
co-operatives would not be social unless they admit the workforce to membership of the 
organisation.  Furthermore, to be social this membership must be accompanied by voice 
rights capable of influencing the design of the governance system, and the selection of 
(at least some) governors. 
This argument can be extended to charitable and voluntary organisations who 
participate in the social economy (Monzon and Chaves, 2008).  Given that charities, 
non-profits and voluntary agencies are frequently last ditch attempts to plug gaps 
created by market and state failure (Alter, 2007), they are often the only provider of 
goods and services needed by their service users.  The position of service users, in these 
cases, is similar to members of a workforce: there are no easy options to switch to an 
alternative supplier (just as there are no easy options for most employees to switch to 
another employer). Where the charity or voluntary organisation is providing goods and 
services that no-one else will supply, the inclusion in governance of those who receive 
them, their capacity to influence the governance system, and their power to select (at 
least some of) the governors, can all be seen as pre-requisites for claiming the enterprise 
is „social‟ rather that „private‟ (see EMES social enterprise definition in Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001). 
For the purposes of this paper, the authors frame this as a socialisation perspective 
on social enterprise, based on the advocacy of worker co-operatives and 
employee-ownership in early policy debates (see Westall, 2001 Ridley-Duff, 2002; 
Teasdale, 2011). This differs from a social purpose perspective rooted in writings on 
social entrepreneurship, drawn from US influences (Leadbeater, 1997; Dees, 1998) and 
popular texts on non-profit management (Hudson, 2002).  The social purpose 
perspective emphasises the social goals of the entrepreneur and the social purposes of 
the enterprises they create (see Martin and Osberg, 2007; Chell, 2007). Whereas the 
socialisation perspective places organizational citizenship and stakeholder rights to 
capital ownership and voice at the heart of its perspective, the social purpose perspective 
de-emphasises these, and places more weight behind institutional arrangements that 
provide support to social entrepreneurs who pursue a social mission (Scofield, 2011).   
Figure 1 shows the socialisation perspective, its grounding in the European 
perspective on the social economy trading (Monzon and Chaves, 2008) and distinguishes 
it from social entrepreneurship rooted in US venture philanthropy. 
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Figure 1 – Theorising ‘Social’ in Social Enterprise 
 
Interpretation of Ellerman, 1990 
 
Founding Mothers and Fathers of the Social Enterprise Movement in the UK 
To illustrate the gradual transition from one perspective to another, the authors now 
explore the mixed heritage of the social enterprise sector, and the way early practitioners 
attempted to balance the philanthropic impulse of US/UK ideas on social 
entrepreneurship with the more commercial and democratic orientation of the EU‟s social 
economy and co-operative sector (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Kerlin, 2006, 2010; 
Monzon and Chaves, 2008). 
 The earliest known formulation of social enterprise ideas in the UK came from a 1970s 
initiative to develop a social audit framework for worker co-operatives at Beechwood 
College (Leeds, West Yorkshire).  In the first social audit toolkit, it is claimed that:  
 “An enterprise that is owned by those who work in it and/or reside in a given locality, 
is governed by registered social as well as commercial aims and objectives and run 
co-operatively may be termed a social enterprise.  Traditionally capital hires labour 
with overriding emphasis on making a profit over and above any benefit either to the 
business itself or the workforce.  Contrasted to this the social enterprise is where 
labour hires capital with the emphasis on social, environmental and financial benefit” 
Spreckley (1981:3) 
 Immediately apparent in this definition are five key concepts: worker and/or 
community ownership of the enterprise (social ownership); social and commercial aims 
(multi-purpose); co-operative management (workplace democracy); social, 
environmental and financial benefit (triple-bottom line); the hiring of capital by labour 
(anti-capitalist orientation).  It moves beyond the traditional concern of co-operatives to 
focus on economic benefits for members and gives explicit recognition to social, 
community and environmental development.   
These early ideas were spread through community enterprise movements in Scotland 
and the North of England (Pearce, 2003), with the language of social enterprise 
stabilising around 1994 after a conference of co-operative and community business 
activists (Southcombe, 2009; Spreckley, 2011).  The conference organisers took an 
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emergent definition and incorporated the Social Enterprise Partnership (SEP)2 to 
propagate it. They regarded social enterprises as trading bodies governed by social 
objectives with distinct characteristics (SEE, 2011 [online]):  Being bound to a set of beneficiaries or community  Having a democratic structure  Having common and shared values  Being open and accountable  Concerned with empowering members  Using and developing volunteers  Offering workers ownership  Creating social wealth  Having an emphasis on co-operation and networking 
These practitioner-based definitions of social enterprise are strikingly similar to the 
early empirical research of the EMES network (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).  Between 
1996-1999, 13 European research centres collected data in their own countries and 
concluded that social enterprises can be described as committed to most or all of the 
following:  Social Dimensions  
• An explicit aim to benefit the community 
• An initiative launched by a group of citizens 
• A decision-making power not based on capital ownership 
• A participatory nature, which involves the persons affected by the activity 
• Limited profit distribution   Economic Dimensions 
• A continuous activity producing goods and/or selling services 
• A high degree of autonomy 
• A significant level of economic risk 
• A minimum amount of paid work (i.e. at least some labour is compensated) 
Defourny (2001) 
These attempts at definition enable us to flesh out the aspects of enterprise that 
contribute towards socialisation and social purpose.  In Table 1, the authors map the 
characteristics of these early attempts in terms of: a) contribution to the socialisation of 
enterprise through the granting of public/social rights to become owners and controllers 
of (financial, social and human) capital, and; b) contribution to public/community benefit 
through social purpose activities.  In contrast to the heavily socialised co-operative 
model, the authors found that early definitions of social enterprise attempt to balance 
socialisation and social purpose.  Even with these changes, the socialisation perspective 
remains strong, rooted in European thinking on social economy (Monzon and Chaves, 
2008). 
                                         
2  The founders of Social Enterprise Partnership Ltd (SEP) – Cliff Southcombe and Freer 
Spreckley – traded from 1997 to 2001.  Local Livelihoods (incorporated 2001) and Social 
Enterprise Europe (incorporated 2003) continued their work.  The 1994 definition is still in 
use by Social Enterprise Europe. 
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Table 1 – Theorising ‘Social’ in Early Theories of Social Enterprise 
Characteristic Socialisation Social Purpose 
Co-operative Enterprise (based on the International Co-operative Alliance definition in force during the 1970s)  Open, voluntary membership X   Democratic governance X   Limited return on equity  X  Surplus belongs to members X   Education of members and public in cooperative principles X X  Cooperation between cooperatives X  
Social Audit Toolkit (Spreckley, 1981)  Worker and/or community ownership X   Social and commercial aims  X  Co-operative management X   Social, environmental and financial benefit  X  The hiring of capital by labour  X  
Social Enterprise Partnership (1994)  Being bound to a set of beneficiaries or community  X  Having a democratic structure X   Having common and shared values    Being open and accountable X   Concerned with empowering members X X  Using and developing volunteers X X  Offering workers ownership X   Creating social wealth  X  Emphasis on co-operation and networking X  
EMES Research (1996-99)  An explicit aim to benefit the community  X  An initiative launched by a group of citizens X   A decision-making power not based on capital ownership X   A participatory nature, which involves the persons 
affected by the activity 
X  
 Limited profit distribution  X  Producing goods and/or selling services  X  A high degree of autonomy X   A significant level of economic risk X   Minimum amount of paid work  X 
    
 This conceptual balance was maintained when Social Enterprise London (SEL) formed 
in 1998.  SEL‟s Memorandum and Articles provides further clues to the context, motives 
and values amongst founders of early social enterprise development agencies.  Figure 2 
shows the company objects (Memorandum of Association, January 1998).  In this 
statement of objects, the influence of the co-operative movement and New Labour are 
evident.  Terminology remains characteristic of socialisation (e.g. participatory 
democracy, co-operatives, co-operative solutions) and this reflects the orientation of the 
co-operative development agencies and worker co-operatives that collaborated in its 
creation (see Appendix A).  The inclusion of objects regarding „equal opportunity‟ and 
„social justice‟ are characteristically Blairite and „third way‟ (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). 
Institute for Small Business & Entrepreneurship   9-10 November 2011 - Sheffield, England 
 
[7] 
Figure 2 – Memorandum of Association, Social Enterprise London 
 
Memorandum of Association – Social Enterprise London – 26th January 1998. 
 
C. Objects 
 (1) The objects of the company are: 
  (i) To promote the principles and values of the social enterprise economy in 
Greater London and its environs. 
  (ii) To promote co-operative solutions for economic and community development. 
  (iii) To promote social enterprises, in particular co-operatives and common 
ownerships, social firms, and other organisations and businesses which put into 
practice the principles of participatory democracy, equal opportunities and 
social justice. 
  (iv) To promote, develop and support local and regional economic resources and 
opportunities.   
  (v) To address social exclusion through economic regeneration. 
  (vi) To create a regional framework to support and resource development of the 
social enterprise sector. 
Source: Companies House  
 From 1995 onwards, US perspectives on social entrepreneurship began to surface in 
European debates (see Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011).  Social entrepreneurship networks, 
and the vast majority of other regional support agencies, did not form until after the 
incorporation of the Social Enterprise Coalition in 2002.  In the context of the Social 
Enterprise Mark, the incorporation of Regional Infrastructure for Social Enterprise Ltd 
(RISE) in March 2003, a social enterprise support agency for the South West of England, 
is particularly relevant.  Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, the Memorandum and 
Articles of both the Social Enterprise Coalition and RISE contain simpler statements of 
support for social enterprise with no mention of co-operative values or participatory 
democracy.  The Social Enterprise Coalition (registered in April 2002) lists only four 
objects which can be summarised as: 
1. To promote the principles and values of the social enterprise economy 
2. To promote social enterprise solutions 
3. To promote social enterprises 
4. To promote regional access to resources for social enterprises throughout the UK. 
When RISE was registered in March 2003, the number of objects is reduced to just one: 
1. To support development of the social enterprise sector in the South West of 
England. 
The connection of both SEC and RISE to the co-operative movement is maintained 
through the use of model rules created by ICOM (Industrial Common Ownership 
Movement), and the registration of both organisations by Julie Woodfine at the 
Co-operative Union in Manchester3.  However, it is noteworthy that this move to 
vagueness regarding objects, values and principles coincides with consultations on a 
Community Interest Company (CIC) throughout 2003.  As a result, the government 
decided to jettison stakeholder democracy as a statutory requirement, and to introduce a 
statutory requirement for a not-for-profit clause that prevents the transfer of residual 
assets from an organisation to private individuals upon dissolution (DTI, 2003; Ridley-
Duff and Bull, 2011).   
                                         
3  This was established by retrieving the incorporation documents for all companies from 
Companies House. 
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While the founders of RISE had connections to the co-operative movement, they may 
not have been as committed to worker and community co-operatives as the founders of 
SEL and SEP.  This may explain the drift away from explicit co-operative principles in 
RISE‟s Articles of Association.  
The Social Enterprise Mark 
RISE‟s thinking on social enterprise developed through a pilot study on the SEM in 2008.  
As the champion of the SEM, RISE consulted a wide range of organisations (including 
representatives from Co-operatives UK) to establish a standard that would communicate 
its value to the wider community and consumers (Finlay, 2011). The SEM was launched 
nationally in 2010 with an attractive discount for early adopters (£99).  From 2011, the 
annual fees have been increased.  They now range from £350 - £10,550 depending on 
the annual income of the social enterprise.  The Social Enterprise Mark Company (2011) 
listed approximately 450 SEM holders in September 2011. 
 In the pilot programme (RISE, 2009, Issue 3), the statement of criteria cites two key 
bases of evidence: 
In order to be eligible for the Social Enterprise Mark, applicants must demonstrate 
that they are a social enterprise whose key driver is trading and that they operate for 
wider social / environmental benefit. 
Applicants will need to provide evidence in two key areas: 
1.  Show through their constitution that a sufficient proportion of the profit made by 
the business is spent on socially beneficial purposes, and that, on dissolution of 
the business, all residual assets are distributed for socially beneficial purposes. 
2.  Show by their activities and their accounts that trading is a key driver and that 
profit generated is used for social or community benefit – whether by the social 
enterprise itself or by another agency. 
RISE, 2008: 1 
Table 2 contains a summary of the criteria developed to evaluate whether an applicant 
for the SEM has a legitimate claim to be identified as a social enterprise. 
Table 2 – The Conceptual Dimensions of the Social Enterprise Mark 
Based on 2008 Pilot Project Based on Voice 2010 Launch 
 Be an eligible legal form (not a sole trader, not a 
partnership or traditional profit-distributing 
company, probably not a co-owed [employee-owned] 
company or limited liability partnership).  Adhere to shareholder restrictions (only have 
shareholders that ͞ĐoŶstitute a ĐoŵŵuŶity ďeŶefit͟ 
or apply the dividend cap set out in the Community 
Interest Company legislation).  Have own constitution and governing body  Profit predominately used / distributed for social / 
environmental purposes (including residual assets).  Have 50% or more income from trading, and have 
traded for at least one year.  Evidence that social / environmental objects are 
being achieved.   
 Social and environmental objects can be 
evidenced in constitutional documents.  Must ďe aŶ ͞iŶdepeŶdeŶt ďusiŶess͟, legally 
constituted, with autonomous governance.  Must earn 50% or more from trading, 
eǀideŶĐed usiŶg ͞staŶdard aĐĐouŶtiŶg 
praĐtiĐes͟  Deǀote 50% or ŵore of the orgaŶisatioŶ͛s 
profits to ͞soĐial/eŶǀiroŶŵeŶtal purposes͟  Ensure that all residual assets are distributed 
for ͚soĐial/eŶǀiroŶŵeŶtal purposes͟ (if 
dissolved).  Can demonstrate that social/environmental 
objects are being achieved. 
In these criteria, it is evident that there has been a discernable change in the 
conceptualisation of social enterprise over time.  As with the CIC, there is a requirement 
for a conventional not-for-profit dissolution clause.  Even though guidance states that the 
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SEM is not limited to specific legal forms, the not-for-profit dissolution clause is likely to 
further narrow the legal forms that are eligible for the award.  In the UK, only 
Community Interest Companies, Community Benefit Societies and Charities are required 
by statute to have dissolution clauses in their Articles of Association.  Other forms of 
social enterprise, in particular (worker) co-operatives, employee-owned businesses and 
wealth sharing social enterprises that adapt a plc or CLS (company limited by shares) will 
find it harder to achieve recognition (see Chapter 7, Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011).   
While some care has been taken not to exclude socialised enterprises unnecessarily – 
through the preservation of arrangements that allow the distribution of profits to 
members - the characteristics of socialised enterprises are no longer explicitly valued or 
evidenced (see Table 3).  A number of characteristics from earlier definitions are absent: 
ownership by the community or workforce is not a requirement; co-operative 
management and/or networking is no longer expected; there is no requirement to assess 
or report on workforce and stakeholder democracy.  
Table 3 – Analysis of the Conceptual Dimensions of the Social Enterprise Mark 
Characteristic Socialisation Social Purpose 
Social Enterprise Mark (RISE, 2008-2010)  Explicit aŶd ͚ǁider͛ social / environmental objects to benefit 
the community. 
 X 
 Legally constituted, with a non-profit dissolution clause that 
secures residual assets for ͚soĐial/eŶǀiroŶŵeŶtal purposes͛. 
 X 
 50% or more trading income (evidence by standard 
accounting practices) 
- - 
 50% or more of trading surpluses (profit) invested in 
social/environmental purposes 
 X 
 Independent business with autonomous governance X   Can demonstrate that social/environmental objects are being 
achieved 
 X 
With this in mind, the authors framed the following research question to guide the 
writing of this paper: 
RQ1.  Do the criteria of the Social Enterprise Mark provide an effective framework for 
evaluating an enterprise‟s claim to be social? 
Methodology 
Critical research aims to have a transformative effect, rather than meet conventional 
standards of generalisability, validity and reliability.  In this study, therefore, the 
evaluation criteria of Kinchloe and McClaren (1994) are adopted and the authors make 
explicit their interpretation of these criteria:  Reflexive interrogation: make research participants (including the researchers) more 
aware of limitations in knowledge about the SEM;  Sensitisation: enable research participants to understand the potential hegemonic 
effects of the SEM and how this will influence notions of „true‟ social enterprise;  Democratisation: enable those affected by the SEM to explore why the definition has 
been constructed in a particular way;  Accommodation: introduce alternative perspectives so participants can evaluate the 
legitimacy of the SEM and its constituent assumptions;  Evaluation: review how participants‟ perspectives on the SEM have been changed by 
the exploratory research. 
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These research commitments were operationalised by designing a learning activity 
that invited participants to apply the criteria in Table 2, together with the full published 
criteria developed by RISE / The SEM Company, to different types of social economy 
trading.  This activity was undertaken by three groups of students who were learning 
about co-operative and social enterprises (total sample 42 participants). 
The first group of participants comprised of 16 people on a 2-day taught course.  The 
majority of this group were co-operative and social enterprise practitioners working to 
support or establish co-operatives and social enterprises.  It included people from the 
Co-operative Group, Co-operative Party, Co-operatives Yorkshire & Humber and various 
Community Interest Companies as well as overseas academics establishing social 
enterprise courses, and students undertaking dissertations in social entrepreneurship.  
The second group (also comprising 16 participants) was drawn primarily from the public 
sector.  It included 14 people employed by a local authority controlled housing 
association who were forming a social enterprise working group to support tenant-led 
enterprises.  The final two in the second group worked directly for (or in) social 
enterprises, and were acting as additional advisers to the project.  The third group 
comprised 10 people studying for an MSc Charity Resource Management.  All participants 
were senior managers or trustees in registered charities studying a module called Charity 
Trading and Social Enterprise.  Participants in the second and third groups had less 
familiarity with the history and development of social enterprise than the first group. 
Whilst opportunity samples run the risk of surfacing only a subset of perspectives, the 
diverse composition of the groups mitigated this danger.  The selected groups enable 
consideration of the likely impact of the SEM within different social enterprise 
constituencies. The reaction of participants, if consistent across the groups, provides an 
authentic indication of the likely impact of the SEM amongst potential applicants.  Prior to 
undertaking the activity with the second and third groups, the authors expected that they 
would reach different conclusions to the first group. 
Participants were asked to study the SEM criteria then consider the following three 
questions: 
1. “Would a democratically owned and controlled enterprise in which the workforce 
decides for itself how to distribute its own surpluses (on a one-person, one vote 
basis) be eligible for the Social Enterprise Mark?” 
2. “Would a trading charity with a range of social and environmental projects, but in 
which members of the workforce are not permitted to participate in governance or 
strategic decision-making be eligible for the Social Enterprise Mark?” 
3. “Would a sole trader making their living entirely from providing advice and 
guidance to social enterprises at below market rates be eligible for recognition?” 
They were asked to rank the examples in order of their likely eligibility for the SEM.  
In the first two groups, their responses were written up on a white board/flip chart for 
further group discussion.  As these results puzzled the authors, the conduct of the 
activity was changed with the third group to ensure that tutor and group discussion was 
not influencing participants‟ conclusions.  They were divided into five discussion pairs and 
asked to individually write down their rankings on paper before reporting them to the 
wider group for discussion.   
The next section reports the findings and key points made in follow up discussions.  
In research terms, this provides evidence from a „focus group‟ type activity, and is 
offered as a valid justification for further critical research, but not as conclusive evidence. 
Findings 
All groups, overall, put the trading charity (Case 2) ahead of the worker co-operative 
(Case 1), and the worker co-operative ahead of the sole trader (Case 3).  They felt the 
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worker co-operative (Case 1) would need to evidence an asset lock and external 
beneficiary group before being eligible for the SEM.  The authors found that groups were 
consistent in this view, despite their diverse experiences in the charity sector, social 
economy and public sector.   
Participants on the first course, who had much more experience of establishing and 
running social enterprises, objected strongly to the way the criteria would prevent award 
winning social enterprises that are employee-owned4 from achieving recognition (such as 
Sunderland Home Care Associates).  Participants from co-operative infrastructure bodies 
questioned whether the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation (an enterprise that is cited 
by agencies as one of the world‟s leading examples of social enterprise) would satisfy the 
SEM criteria.   
In Group 3 (charity trustees and managers) roughly half the group felt that their 
organisation would meet the SEM‟s criteria even though they had not previously 
considered their organisation to be a social enterprise.  One charity student felt strongly 
that a charity should not be awarded the SEM unless its workforce and stakeholders were 
recognised in its governance system (even if it met all other criteria).  Similar views were 
expressed amongst participants in the first group as they perceived that the definition of 
social enterprise had been reframed to advantage enterprises with charity-like 
characteristics (social purpose) instead those with co-operative characteristics 
(socialisation).  Participants noted the irony that the founders of Social Enterprise London 
(which included four worker co-operatives and four co-operative development agencies), 
as well as winners of regional and national social enterprise awards, may be seen as 
ineligible for the Social Enterprise Mark.  This became such a talking point amongst 
experienced practitioners that it continued in e-mail correspondence and meetings 
(including one with Peter Holbrook, CEO of the Social Enterprise Coalition) after the 
course.   
Whilst only some co-operatives were likely to obtain the SEM, and only then if they 
modified their social objects and auditing processes to specifically acknowledge and 
address external stakeholders, trading charities would qualify for the SEM even if they 
made no changes in their relations with internal stakeholders (employees and members).  
It was this realisation that prompted one participant (in dialogue with the authors of this 
paper) to start work on an alternative „mark‟ that emphasised business ethics and 
democratic accountability. 
In the case of a sole trader (Case 3), all three groups of participants felt they would 
be the least likely to qualify for the SEM because of the requirement to incorporate and 
control the distribution of residual assets.  In practice, this means that a consultant, 
working solely in the social economy providing advice and training – perhaps counter-
intuitively – cannot be recognised as engaged in social enterprise.  This is all the more 
surprising when self-employed people who profit maximise are instantly recognisable as 
advocates of private enterprise.  Conceptually, however, participants did recognise that 
self-employed people can engage in social entrepreneurship, and that there are bodies 
(such as ASHOKA and UnLtd) that recognise their work as individuals.   
Taken together, these discussions crystallised how the conceptualisation of social 
enterprise (as defined by the SEM) is framed to promote the incorporation and 
autonomous governance of trading organisations that pursue social or environmental 
goals, but not the socialisation of ownership, management and entrepreneurship or the 
participatory democracy envisaged by Ellerman (1990) and Turnbull (1995, 2002).  This 
being the case, only the task of the enterprise is social, not its arrangements for 
ownership, wealth distribution, management or governance. 
                                         
4  This is employee-owned in the sense of the workforce having an unambiguous entitlement 
to a share of the wealth created by the organisation, and control over the distribution of 
the organisation‟s assets in cases of dissolution.  This can be contrasted with worker 
co-operatives that have no share capital, and dissolution clauses that prevent the transfer 
to assets to members in cases of dissolution. 




The SEM criteria, as interpreted by study participants, suggest there is an orientation 
towards charity-like (non-profit) criteria based on an external purpose, rather than 
participative democracy, co-operative management and social inclusion.  This created a 
paradox that the first group of participants, in particular, found troubling.  The pursuit of 
democratic ownership, inclusive management practices and democratic control of capital, 
are not in themselves considered to be social purposes or to constitute a community 
benefit.  In light of the company objects of SEL, it is clear that the re-formulation of 
social enterprise using the SEM‟s criteria removes participatory democracy as a core 
characteristic, and subverts social enterprise discourse so that it fits the dominant 
discourses of business (Dart, 2004; Johnson, 2006) and the non-profit sector (see 
Carver, 1990; Hudson, 2002).   
SEM criteria value philanthropic concepts such as „social objects‟ and 
„community/public benefit‟, and private enterprise concepts such as „market trading‟, 
„incorporation‟ and „accounting‟, but not co-operative concepts such as „voluntary 
association‟, „participatory democracy‟ and „democratic control of capital‟.  The early 
formulations of social enterprise invite an assessment of whether the Articles of 
Association define the process by which the workforce and service users (customers) 
participate in governance and wealth sharing.  These criteria, however, are absent from 
the SEM. 
This point is noted in Westall (2009) during the final phase of developing The Social 
Enterprise Mark criteria.  She states:  
The Social Enterprise Mark is „a label which tells customers about the wider social or 
environmental impact they offer‟ …It is important to note that the focus is on impacts 
not processes and that there are restrictions on profit distribution.  There is therefore 
little working through as yet on inherent values and social benefits as processes 
rather than external impacts which has resulted in some interesting exclusions of 
particularly co-operatives and mutuals…You also cannot be a company limited by 
shares under the proposed criteria which would mean that organisations such as 
Café Direct would not be included at the time of writing. 
Westall (2009:6-7) 
Given the co-operative roots of the movement (in the UK and EU), this formulation of 
social enterprise is likely to be – and remain - divisive.  Co-operatives UK recognise many 
types of co-operative enterprise, including many forms that have no asset lock written 
into their constitution.  This does not prevent them from socialising their ownership, 
management, governance and wealth sharing processes.  Indeed, the essence of 
co-operativism is that members democratically control the capital of their enterprise 
(ICA, 1995, 2005).  Attempts to remove democratic control - to which a statutory or 
regulated asset-lock contributes - places assets into the hands of industry regulators 
(and legal professionals) reintroducing a hierarchical rather than a mutual model of social 
control.  This being the case, the SEM criteria undermine “the principles of participatory 
democracy” advocated by Social Enterprise London (1998). 
In respect of Mondragon, there is sufficient flexibility in the SEM criteria regarding the 
payment of profits to members to accommodate their practices.  However, at Mondragon 
members have personal capital accounts as well as collective reserves.  These accounts 
receive trading profits (varying from 40 – 70% in any one year), but can only been 
withdrawn when a member leaves or retires (BBC, 1980; Whyte and Whyte, 1991).  In 
practice, it is rare for a Mondragon co-operative to exceed the 50% SEM threshold 
because they contribute profits to infrastructure bodies as well as their own collective 
reserves before distributing the balance to members.  However, members‟ accounts do 
represent a form of private property, and can be used as security for bank loans and 
mortgages.  Furthermore, the surpluses (i.e. reserves) remain the collective property of 
members, and members retain democratic powers to decide how they will be distributed 
if an enterprise taken over or closed (Oakeshott, 1990; Ridley-Duff, 2010).  With these 
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characteristics, it is reasonable to conclude that Mondragon-style co-operatives would not 
satisfy SEM criteria. 
As things stand, trading, incorporation and profitability - previously the means (rather 
than the purposes) of the social economy - have been reframed as the ends of social 
enterprise (Dart, 2004).  While these ends might be important for evidencing „enterprise‟ 
in social purpose organisations, they do not evidence „socialisation‟ in a company limited 
shares (CLS), a public limited company (plc), or one limited by a members‟ guarantee 
(CLG).  This being the case, the SEM does not yet provide a framework that meets the 
needs (or aspirations) of a significant part of the social enterprise movement. 
Whether the SEM provides appropriate criteria, however, is only part of the issue.  
Curtis (2008: 280) highlights how frameworks like the SEM act to normalise the 
regulation of social entrepreneurship and facilitate “state-sponsored social enterprise”.  
Regulated social enterprises that adopt a form suitable for public and charitable 
investment provide a useful vehicle for quasi-markets, deregulation and business-like 
management practices characteristic of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995).  
This may explain why statutory powers of intervention were given to the CIC regulator, 
but not to the organisation‟s own stakeholders.  It may also help to explain why the SEM 
received public funding and follows some of the norms established by the Community 
Interest Company (on the dissolution clause, dividend cap and accounting practices).  
Curtis, however, argues that this standardisation undermines self-emerging social 
enterprise development grounded in voluntary action, community enterprise, trade union 
activism and co-operative development.  In these cases, he argues, it is „grit that makes 
the pearl‟, a metaphor for the way that resistance to a dominant discourse acts as the 
catalyst for the creation of new legal forms, information systems, and management 
practices that value diversity, difference and dialogue. 
Rejecting NPM, however, depends on an enhanced role for critical thinking.  Unlike 
traditional knowledge development under NPM, in which a critical perspective is seen as a 
check and counter-balance to dominant „rationalist‟ norms, co-operative and 
employee-owned social enterprises adopt a critical perspective as their starting point for 
designing systems of ownership and control (see Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011, Erdal, 
2011).  Following the managerial logic implicit in critical theory (Alvesson and Deetz, 
2000; Parker, 2002) information systems can be designed to share and reveal 
information to internal and external stakeholders, and prevent management control of it.  
Governance systems, likewise, are designed to include enterprise stakeholders at various 
stages of decision-making, and not to inhibit their participation or promote their 
exclusion. 
It is noteworthy that the characteristics of enterprise put forward by early 
contributors to social enterprise (labour hiring capital, co-operative ownership and 
networking, extending worker ownership, participatory management) are now more 
likely to be found amongst advocates of employee ownership and co-operativism, and 
less amongst the ranks of social entrepreneurs (see Davies, 2009; Erdal, 2011). The 
regulation of the CIC model by the state, and particularly the inclusion of an asset lock, 
transforms it into a charity-like vehicle for the transfer of state assets to community 
interest companies, and social investment in „public‟ services.  As the Social Enterprise 
Mark embeds many of the assumptions of the CIC model in its own evaluation criteria, 
this makes it relatively easy for CICs to obtain the SEM.  At the time of writing 72 (of 
approximately 3,700) CICs were listed as SEM holders.  In contrast, only 19 (of 
approximately 5,000) co-operatives had applied, with 17 being successful (Finlay, 2011).  
There are two reasons not to be surprised by this.  Firstly, co-operatives already have 
strong brand recognition that they may want to protect.  Secondly, the SEM criteria – 
unlike the ICA criteria which focus on socialisation (see Table 1), are almost all focussed 
on social purpose (see Table 3). 
Interestingly, the SEM (albeit not obviously) contains a clause that provides an 
escape route from rationalist thinking and managerialism (Grey and Mitev, 1995).  One 
evaluation criterion, potentially, offers a pathway back to participative democracy.  The 
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last criterion of the SEM requires that applicants provide evidence that their social and 
environmental objectives are being achieved.  This requirement, depending on the way it 
is interpreted and operationalised, requires some form of social audit and reporting. 
Social auditing was developed in the worker and community co-operative movement at 
Beechwood College as a methodology for reviewing their social and environmental impact 
(Spreckley, 1981).  It has subsequently been used by many social enterprises as a 
methodology for governance (Pearce and Kay, 2008; Southcombe, 2009). 
The significance of the Beechwood Model - and the SEN model that followed - is that 
it advocates a participative and inclusive approach to governance.  This regards 
employees, volunteers and beneficiaries (i.e. customers and/or service users) as 
stakeholders in organisation development.  Even if social enterprises have hierarchical 
structures that initially exclude volunteers and/or workers from policy development and 
strategic decision-making, social audit acts as the catalyst for their reintegration into 
co-operative management.  This, it is claimed, protects (or re-establishes) the social 
nature of the enterprise by countering the discourse and practices of private enterprise 
management.  In short, it provides a pathway back to socialisation of enterprise by 
supporting inclusive governance processes, and not just econometric measures of social 
impact. 
In concluding this section, therefore, there is a clear case for further exploration of 
the origins and development of the Social Enterprise Mark to uncover how its 
conceptualisation and criteria were socially constructed, who they benefit, and what 
impact they are having.  Particularly important for any further exploration is a 
consideration of the SEM‟s effect on stakeholder involvement in governance, wealth 
sharing and decision-making to see whether the requirements regarding audit offer 
another way to socialise enterprise development processes. 
Conclusions 
This exploratory paper is the first stage of an ongoing research project to deconstruct the 
conceptual dimensions and understand the discursive effects of the Social Enterprise 
Mark. From this first phase, it is possible to outline some theoretical conclusions that can 
be further explored and developed in subsequent work. 
 Firstly, the SEM‟s focus on social purpose at the expense of socialisation makes it 
more attractive to the public, private and charitable sectors as they seek to reinvigorate 
the principles of New Public Management (Hood, 1995) and accelerate the break up of 
state institutions.  As the state is broken into more business units, the SEM provides a 
way to legitimise the enterprises that take over public services, but without 
fundamentally altering labour relations or limiting management control.  The dissolution 
clause, at least on paper, retains community control over state assets, but it relies on 
regulation (rather than participative democracy) as the institutional enforcer of social 
purposes and governance. Which is more effective in practice? 
 Secondly, a regulated asset lock (rather than one voted for by members) moves social 
enterprise closer to a trust law mentality, potentially weakening mutuality and 
participatory democracy as important concepts in the social economy.  This is at odds 
with the early theorisations of social enterprise which depended on democratic member 
control to ensure assets were used for community benefit, and which allowed distribution 
of assets under member control.  Regulated locks may satisfy public and charitable 
funders, but it also increases their power relative to those who work in (or use the 
services of) a social enterprise.  Legal and regulatory instruments now prevent 
organisational members from exercising democratic control over the capital created by 
them. 
 Furthermore, regulated assets locks are, arguably, less appropriate where a large 
number of small shareholders have created an enterprise to lift themselves out of 
poverty.  As Yunus (2007) argues, there is rationale in favour of for-profit social 
enterprises where the incomes of the workforce are low, and the enterprise is socialised.  
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In the UK, the share of liquid assets owned by the poorest 50% of the population has 
dropped from 11% to 1% over the last 15 years (ONS, 2006; Davies, 2009).  Socialised 
„for-profit‟ enterprises that redress this imbalance create social and economic benefits not 
only for individuals but also for the communities and societies in which they are 
embedded (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010).  In poor communities, a trust law mentality 
(and non-profit orientation) makes it harder to lift a community out of poverty because 
non-profits depend on maintaining a pool of beneficiaries to justify their continued 
existence.  If a for-profit social enterprise fulfils its social purpose by lifting people out of 
poverty, it remains socialised.  The continuing social benefit is that it acts as a buttress 
against future impoverishment (Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011). 
 It is this last point that provides the rationale for recognising social enterprises that 
transform labour relations through worker control and employee-ownership.  There is 
strong evidence from Mondragon in Spain (Whyte and Whyte, 1991) and Emilia Romana 
in Italy (Retaskis, 2011) that these arrangements transform regional economies within a 
generation if they receive consistent political support. 
 In arriving at a conclusion to the question “Do the criteria of the Social Enterprise 
Mark provide an effective framework for evaluating an enterprise‟s claim to be social?” 
this paper provides a mixed answer.  The answer is „yes‟ in respect of evidencing an 
enterprise‟s claim to have a social purpose and make a social impact but „no‟ in respect 
of socialising entrepreneurship, ownership, governance and wealth distribution so that 
poverty is permanently alleviated. 
 In the next phase of research, it will be necessary to deconstruct the SEM‟s evaluation 
criteria by conducting a historical analysis of the way they developed.  Aside the many 
background reports and on-line discussions that now exist, interviews with the people 
who participated in its development will be helpful.  To avoid executive capture, and 
ensure those affected by the SEM have an equal voice it its future development, 
interviews will also be needed with applicants and holders of the SEM, as well as those 
who were denied the SEM, and who actively chose not to apply for it.  For this reason, a 
strategy based on purposive and snowball sampling through existing social enterprise 
networks offers the best opportunity for theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 The third and final stage of the research will involve a web-based diagnostic survey 
that asks the question „how social is your enterprise?‟ and evaluates responses against 
different social constructions of social enterprise.  This will enable further testing of the 
theoretical conclusions in this paper and offer a range of options for developing inclusive 
criteria that legitimises different types of social value creation. 
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